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Iran–Iraq war continued to exert
upward pressure on prices. Prices
climbed to $39 per barrel by 1981.
Over the next few years, how-
ever, increased prices led to fuel-
switching, energy conservation and
increased oil production outside
of OPEC. A loss of market share
exacerbated by slow world eco-
nomic growth led to a breakdown
of OPEC solidarity. World oil prices
plummeted to $11 per barrel in
1986. In recent years, oil has gen-
erally traded in a range from $17 to
$20 per barrel,
with a brief





economic activity in some of these
states that observers proclaimed
energy “the tail that wagged the dog.”
Since the early 1980s, however,
state economies have become less
sensitive to and more alike in their
responses to changes in oil prices.
These changes are the result of
trends in the energy industry that
are likely to continue throughout
the 1990s.
Forces Shaping the Energy Industry
Several forces have shaped the
U.S. energy industry’s recent history.
The most apparent are prices, which
are determined by world oil market
conditions, and resource depletion.
Government regulation, taxes and
technology have also affected the
industry.
The past 25 years have brought
four price shocks, three long-lasting
and one rather short-lived. The first
shock came in 1973 after the Orga-
nization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) announced pro-
duction cutbacks and an embargo
of oil supplies to the United States in
retaliation for U.S. support of Israel
in the Arab–Israeli war. By January
1974, world oil prices had more
than tripled.
The Iranian revolution led to
another sharp increase in world oil
prices in 1979. The subsequent
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he energy industry figures promi-
nently in many states’ economies.
In Texas, for example, the energy
industry produces about 12 percent
of gross state product. For Wyoming,
the figure exceeds 25 percent.1
Because the United States is an
energy-importing country, its eco-
nomy is hurt by rising oil prices. In
fact, the economies of 41 states and
the District of Columbia suffer when
oil prices rise. Nine states—Alaska,
Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Texas and Wyoming—benefit from
rising oil prices. In six of these
states—Alaska, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and
Wyoming—the response to an oil
price change is much stronger than
in the average state. In fact, oil price
movements in the 1970s and 1980s






Just Say Yes to Chile2
Although current oil prices are
near $20 per barrel, real (inflation-
adjusted) oil prices are just above
preshock 1973 levels. Chart 1 shows
how closely employment in oil and
gas extraction tracks oil prices. As
the price of oil rises and falls, so
does U.S. employment in oil and
gas extraction.
The United States has produced
oil for more than a century, and U.S.
fields are considered mature. Peak
production was in 1970 when out-
put reached 9.6 million barrels per
day. Since then, resource depletion
has led to a general decline in
domestic production. The general
decline was interrupted from the
mid-1970s to mid-1980s as oil prices
increased and production from the
North Slope of Alaska began.
Because the United States has
mature oil fields, production is from
a large number of small wells. In
1991, the United States had more
than 600,000 wells, with an average
production of 12 barrels per day.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia had 1,400
wells with an average production of
nearly 6,000 barrels per day. With
mature fields, the outlook for U.S.
production is continued decline, at
a rate of about 2 percent per year.
The demand for oil responds to
its price and to economic growth.
Oil consumption surged in the 1970s
as the economy expanded (Chart
2), but higher oil prices reduced
consumption in the early 1980s.
Since 1985, economic growth and
lower oil prices have contributed to
a general increase in oil consump-
tion, although usage dipped slightly
in 1991. The Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas predicts that continued
economic growth, coupled with
moderate price increases, will stimu-
late oil consumption over the
coming decades.
With rising oil consumption and
declining domestic production, the
United States has been importing a
greater percentage of the oil it con-
sumes. Oil imports are expected to
surpass domestic production in the
next few years. Although oil imports
have been rising, the ratio of energy
consumption to gross domestic
product (GDP) has been declining
over time, reducing worries about
U.S. dependence on foreign energy
sources.
In the U.S. market for refined
products, output in domestic refin-
eries has closely tracked consump-
tion in the U.S. market. This tight
relationship may not be maintained
in the future. The U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) expects that current
environmental regulations will pre-
vent much expansion of domestic
refining as the U.S. market expands.
Instead, DOE expects new refineries
to be built in the Caribbean region,
where environmental restrictions
are less stringent. In contrast, some
energy industry analysts believe
domestic refineries will retain a con-
stant share of the U.S. market. The
principal factors in this differing out-
look are weaker demand growth
and the relatively higher cost of
transporting products compared
with crude oil.
One reason for concern about
rising oil imports is dependence on
oil from politically unstable parts of
the world. World oil reserves are
approximately 1,000 billion barrels
(Map 1). OPEC countries hold 770
billion barrels or (77 percent) of
these reserves. Within OPEC, 66
percent of world reserves are in the
Middle East. North America has 8
percent of world reserves. At 50
billion barrels (or 5 percent), Mexico
has the seventh largest reserve base
in the world, and the former Soviet
Union has about 6 percent of world
reserves.
As the reserve levels suggest,
much world oil production comes
from OPEC—more than 40 percent
in 1994. As world oil consumption
grows and resources are depleted
elsewhere, OPEC’s share of world
oil production will grow over time.
In recent years, however, non-OPEC
supplies have surged, particularly
in the North Sea. Lower taxes and
improved technology have kept
North Sea oil production higher
than many analysts anticipated.
Chart 2
U.S. Petroleum Production,
Consumption and Net Imports







































That is not the case for the former
Soviet Union, where output has
been declining. Physical and institu-
tional problems suggest that no
reversal of this downward trend is
likely until 2000. In the United
States, the decline in oil production
is unlikely to reverse, unless the
drilling restrictions in environmen-
tally sensitive areas, such as the
Alaska National Wildlife Reserve
and California coast, are eased.
The dynamics at work in the
energy industry make it difficult to
predict oil prices. Nevertheless,
Chart 3 presents several forecasts:
three from the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) and one from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
All these forecasts abstract from a
political disruption. The Dallas Fed
forecast expects oil prices to be soft
for the next five years and to remain
in a range between $17 to $20 per
barrel (1994 dollars) through 2000.
This outlook is consistent with the
futures market, and it reflects current
excess capacity and the return of
Iraqi oil to international markets
by 1997.
The Dallas Fed forecast relies on
the expectation that OPEC will reach
full capacity around 2000, as world
oil demand grows and non-OPEC
supply declines. After that, the fore-
cast predicts oil prices will gener-
ally rise, reaching about $27 per
barrel in 2010. Higher oil prices
seem necessary to overcome political
and economic obstacles to obtaining
the investment needed to expand
OPEC capacity. The Dallas Fed price
outlook falls below the Department
of Energy’s midrange forecast. We
expect that oil prices lower than
those forecast by DOE will attract
the required investment.
The uppermost and lowest fore-
cast lines reflect the Department of
Energy’s reasonable upper and
lower bounds for oil prices. Major
technological breakthroughs or a
lack of demand growth could lead
to prices below the range shown
here, but the probability of a sus-
tained price below the lower bound
is quite small.
It would be surprising to see
prices sustained above the Depart-
ment of Energy’s upper bound. The
upper bound path is reminiscent
of the typical forecast made in the
1980s when increasing scarcity meant
oil prices were expected to escalate
from their current levels at some
real interest rate. Such a price path
forecast typically fails to take into
account technological improvement
and the effect of higher prices in
stimulating supply and curtailing
demand. Nonetheless, supply dis-
ruptions could lead to temporary
excursions above the range.
As shown in Chart 4, the move-
ments in natural gas prices mirror
those of oil. Research by Yücel and
Guo (1994) shows that oil and
natural gas prices move together
over long periods of time, while
natural gas prices remain below oil
prices for an equivalent amount of
energy.2 Natural gas prices did not
move fully with crude oil prices in
the 1970s because price controls
restricted the movement of well-
head prices for natural gas. Looking
forward, the relatively flat outlook
for oil prices suggests a similar
outlook for natural gas prices.
Implications of Changes in the
Energy Industry
Our research indicates that
changes in the energy industry can
affect how regional economic activity
responds to oil prices.3 Changes in
the response to oil prices could alter
the regional flavor of the debate
over U.S. energy policy. In the past,
debate over energy policy had a
regional tone. Energy-producing
states favored policies, such as re-
strictions on oil imports, that would
increase domestic prices. Energy-
consuming states favored policies,
such as price controls, that would
reduce domestic prices. Dallas Fed
research indicates that the grounds
for these regional divisions may
be lessening.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the
U.S. energy industry grew to keep
pace with increasing demand and
sharply rising oil prices. As Chart 5
shows, in 1982 five key energy
industries—coal mining, oil and
gas extraction, oil field equipment,
petroleum refining and petrochemi-
cals—accounted for 1.6 million
jobs (0.8 percent of total U.S. non-
farm employment).
Chart 3
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The decline and later collapse of
oil prices in the 1980s touched off
a drastic downsizing of oil and gas
extraction and related services. Coal
prices also fell, and coal mining
was reduced. Continued adjustment
to earlier increases in oil prices,
more stringent government regula-
tion and productivity gains led to
falling employment in refining and
petrochemicals.
By 1992, employment in the five
key energy industries had fallen by
more than 600,000 jobs. More than
350,000 jobs were lost in oil and
gas extraction alone. At the same
time, U.S. nonfarm employment
grew by 23 percent. By 1992, the
share of total nonfarm employ-
ment represented by the five key
energy industries was halved to
0.9 percent. Projections suggest that
by 2000, employment in the five
key energy industries will further
decline while total nonfarm em-
ployment expands.
While energy-related industries
have been shrinking, individual state
economies have increasingly diver-
sified away from energy-intensive
and energy-producing industries.
Since the early 1980s, nearly every
state has become less dependent
on the five key energy industries.
Chart 6 illustrates the point for select
energy-intensive states. From 1982
to 1992, employment in the five key
energy industries declined in each
of the nine states. The Dallas Fed
projects the trend will continue
throughout the 1990s but at a
slower rate.
Chart 7 depicts the implications
of continued diversification away
from energy-intensive and energy-
producing industries. The estimates
underlying this chart take into
account how higher oil prices would
affect each of the five key industries,
as well as the rest of each state’s
economy. From 1982 to 1992 and
2000, the effects of the same per-
centage increase in oil prices on
each state diminish. States also are
becoming more similar to each
other and the national average in
their response to oil price changes.
However, as the chart shows, the
rate of change is slowing.
The Dallas Fed projects that the
response to oil prices in Alaska,
Delaware, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming
will remain substantially different
from the national average. Energy
is and will continue to be an impor-
tant difference between the nation
and these energy-intensive states.
The Changing Environment
For U.S. Energy Policy
The next three maps extend our
analysis nationwide to examine the
economic environment for U.S.
energy policy (Maps 2, 3 and 4).
On each map, red indicates states
that are hurt by rising oil prices.
The darker the red, the greater the
impact. Delaware is the state hurt
most by rising oil prices. Green
indicates states that are helped by
rising oil prices. The darker the
green, the greater the gain. In 1982,
Oklahoma and Wyoming benefited
most from rising oil prices.
The pattern depicted in Map 2
illustrates why regional divisions
have developed in the debate over
energy policy and why the resolu-
tion of conflicts may have tended
to favor consumers over producers.
As the map shows, 13 states would
have been helped by higher oil
prices in 1982. The other 37 and
the District of Columbia would
have been hurt.
Between 1982 and 1992, as Map
3 shows, Utah, Mississippi, West
Virginia and Montana diversified
away from energy production to
the extent that they no longer
benefit from higher oil prices. The
map also shows that the states
have become less sensitive and
more similar in their response to
oil prices. These changes suggest
that the grounds for regional divi-
sions in the debate over energy
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Energy-Related Employment for Select States
Percent of total non-agricultural employment5
Map 2
Oil Price Sensitivity, 1982
Map 4
Oil Price Sensitivity, 2000
Map 3
Oil Price Sensitivity, 1992
As shown on the map for 2000
(Map 4), the Dallas Fed projects
Kansas will no longer be helped by
higher oil prices and that states
generally will continue to become
less sensitive to and more alike in
their response to oil price move-
ments. These changes suggest the
grounds for regional divisions in the
debate over energy policy are likely
to diminish further in the 1990s.
Conclusions
Market fundamentals suggest that
oil prices are unlikely to rise or fall
sharply for a sustained period during
the next decade. Political events
could lead to temporary deviations
from this outlook. Natural gas prices
will move in concert with oil prices
but will remain below oil prices
for equivalent amounts of energy.
Regulatory constraints could hinder
the growth of the domestic refining
industry as the U.S. market for
refined products expands.
Since 1982, state economies have
become less sensitive and more
similar to each other in their re-
sponse to oil price movements.
The convergence suggests that the
grounds for regional divisions in
the debate over national energy
policy have lessened since the early
1980s. These trends are likely to
continue in the 1990s but at a
slower pace.
— Stephen P. A. Brown
Mine K. Yücel
Notes
1 These percentages were true for 1991,
the most recent year for which data
are available.
2 See Mine K. Yücel and Shengyi Guo,
“Fuel Taxes and Cointegration of
Energy Prices,” Contemporary Eco-
nomic Policy 21 (July 1994): 33–41.
3 See Stephen P. A. Brown and Mine K.
Yücel, “Energy Prices and State Eco-
nomic Performance,” Federal Reserve







erosion of political support might
tempt governments to abandon
currency boards during financial
stress. Then, the policies govern-
ments impose to replace currency
boards may lead to the same de-
valuations and financial crises the
boards were designed to prevent.
The recent experience of Argen-
tina suggests that currency boards
are not the panacea their advocates
claim. (See the sidebar.)
A Historical Perspective
Advocates claim there have been
many successful currency board
experiences. For example, Hanke
and Schuler (1994, 54) assert that
“approximately 70 countries have
had currency boards....” They fail
to mention that most of those 70
countries were British colonies in
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the
Middle East.
Few currency boards have ever
operated in independent countries.
Those that did—North Russia,
Danzig and Malaya—never lasted
more than four years. No orthodox
currency board operates today in
any independent country. The so-
called Singapore currency board is
actually a department of the Mon-
etary Authority of Singapore, which
has the formal powers and respon-
sibilities of a central bank. Argentina’s
current regime is perhaps the
closest to an orthodox currency
board that exists today.
The institutional arrangements
of all the British colonies’ currency
boards suggest that they may have
successfully prevented devaluations
solely because they were run by
foreign powers. Indeed, currency
matters in those colonies were the
responsibility of the British Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies, who
issued currency board regulations
and appointed board members.
Obviously, monetary policy in
Mexico would be more credible
were it administered by the Bundes-
bank. Hanke and Schuler’s pro-
posed model for a modern currency
board confirms the suspicion that
currency boards succeeded not
because of their structure but be-
cause foreign powers controlled
them. According to Hanke and
Schuler (1994, 81), currency boards
should be run by “foreign directors
appointed by commercial banks.”
It is difficult to conceive how the
authority of foreign directors could
be enforced against eventual popu-
lar opposition. Enforcement could
require military intervention by a
foreign power, something that might
be unacceptable to the international
community.
Currency Boards and the
Money Supply
The currency board is a rule for
money creation: the currency board
issues money only against a desig-
nated reserve currency at a fixed
exchange rate. Two common re-
serve currencies are the U.S. dollar
and German mark.
The example in Chart 1 relies on
Chart 1
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o the surprise of most, if not all,
analysts and economic advisors,
Mexico’s December 1994 currency
crisis quickly spread to other emerg-
ing economies. Investors’ fears that
those economies would devalue
soon became evident in a swift,
massive and indiscriminate outflow
of capital from Latin America that
observers dubbed the tequila effect.
As the tequila effect rippled
across the continent, living standards
deteriorated for millions of Mexicans
and other Latin Americans. Mexico’s
heightened risk of debt default
prompted a bailout by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the
United States.
Some observers contend that the
Mexican crisis and its damaging
spillover effects might have been
avoided had Mexico had a currency
board. Their arguments may sound
convincing, but they presume that
once a currency board system is in
place, a country will adhere to it
forever. This assumption is as un-
realistic and naive as the belief that
a wedding ring guarantees an ever-
lasting marriage.
Stubborn adherence to a currency
board exposes societies to severe
and protracted credit crunches, as
in the Great Depression. Rising
unemployment and consequent
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the U.S. dollar as the reserve cur-
rency. An investor (foreign or do-
mestic) decides to invest $2 million
in a country with a currency board.
To buy the local goods, machines
and labor required for the invest-
ment, the investor needs the local
currency and to that end, hands
over $2 million to that country’s
currency board. In exchange, the
local currency board gives the
investor local currency (say, pesos)
at the rate established by the fixed
exchange rate (say, 2 pesos per
dollar). In other words, the currency
board gives the investor 4 million
pesos of the currency board’s money
in exchange for the investor’s $2
million. This currency board money
is nothing but the bills and coins
people carry in their wallets. These
bills and coins are actually the
currency board’s liabilities—that is,
upon demand the currency board
must exchange those bills and
coins for the reserve currency.
Part of the fiduciary money issued
by the currency board will remain
in the public’s wallets, but the rest
will be deposited in commercial
banks. Those bills and coins (that
is, the currency board’s liabilities in
the form of money) in the banks
become the commercial banks’ cash
reserves, which they use to make
loans and create deposits through
the standard money multiplier.
Chart 1 depicts a hypothetical
economy in which half the money
created by the currency board stays
in the public’s wallets and the rest
is deposited in commercial banks.
Typically, the public withdraws only
a fraction of the banks’ cash reserves
on any given day. In this example,
banks must satisfy, on average,
daily cash withdrawals of only half
their cash reserves, or 1 million
pesos. One million pesos, then,
would be left idling in the banks’
vaults. Of course, profit-driven
bankers will lend that money by
opening accounts against which
borrowers can issue checks for up
to 2 million pesos.
In this example, total deposits in
the banking system after the loans
Argentina’s recent experience demon-
strates what can happen with a currency
board during a financial crisis. Argentina’s
monetary policy has operated very much
as a currency board would have since April
1, 1991, when the country’s congress
approved a convertibility law.
The law obligated the central bank
to issue domestic currency (the peso) only
against the dollar value of foreign re-
serves. The law also fixed the exchange
rate at 1:1, or $1 per peso. This standard
is the basic rule for money creation under
a currency board arrangement.
Under the convertibility law, Argen-
tina’s base money and foreign reserves should move very much in tandem, as they do in Chart A. This
pattern is typical of currency board regimes, under which base money increases as foreign reserves rise
and decreases as foreign reserves fall.
As the chart shows, foreign reserves started to fall in Argentina in January 1995, when the tequila
effect spread and investors withdrew capital from the country in fear of a devaluation. The chart makes
apparent that currency boards are not seen as everlasting protection against devaluation. The reason is
because the same currency board features that prevent devaluations can exacerbate fears that the currency
board will be abandoned. Under a currency board, a relatively minor Orange County-like liquidity crisis
can become a full-blown financial panic almost overnight. This is what happened in Argentina. In such
circumstances, governments come under rising pressure to restore the lender of last resort function that
is part of monetary policy under a central bank but is incompatible with a currency board regime.
Argentina’s problem started with a liquidity squeeze in Bank Extrader, a small bank that held barely
0.2 percent of all the deposits in Argentina’s financial system. Extrader was heavily exposed in Mexican
bonds and securities. When the value of those assets fell dramatically in the aftermath of Mexico’s December
20, 1994, peso devaluation, the bank could no longer cover its short-term liabilities, particularly time deposits.
This shortage triggered a bank run, making matters even worse. On January 18 the central bank was forced
to liquidate Extrader. Suddenly, the effect seen elsewhere in Latin America spilled into Argentina’s domestic
financial markets. Fear that other banks were also heavily exposed to the collapsing Latin American capital
markets led depositors to withdraw their money from the banks for the security of their mattresses or accounts
abroad.
By April 30, the financial system had lost 18 percent of the deposits it had before the Mexican peso
devaluation. To cover the withdrawals, the banks were forced to liquidate assets. One liquidation method
was not to renew lines of credit to consumers and businesses. Many businesses and consumers could
not pay off the loans on such short notice. When they did, it was by not paying other obligations. In
turn, the beneficiaries of those debts could not meet their obligations, and so on.
In the wake of this panic, many banks had to suspend the payment of deposits. Some investors—
foreign and domestic alike—have not yet been able to recover their savings. Real economic activity in
Argentina has followed the decline of financial indicators. Sales of cars, apparel and consumer electronics
had fallen 20 to 40 percent by the end of April. Although currency boards are supposed to prevent the
kind of financial meltdown Mexico experienced, Argentina found itself in a crisis despite its monetary policy.
Given the magnitude of Argentina’s credit crunch, one wonders why Argentina has not followed Great
Britain’s example and suspended its currency board arrangement until the financial crisis is resolved. The
answer, as a great deal of economic research suggests, lies in the monetary authority’s credibility.
Argentina lacks the distinguished track record that the Bank of England had when it suspended the
gold standard. In fact, Argentina has made into the Guinness Book of World Records for its historically
high inflation rates and, in particular, its hyperinflations of 1989–90, when inflation rates reached 200
percent per month. Therefore, it’s likely that investors would perceive a temporary suspension of the currency
board announced by the monetary authority as permanent. Such a perception would weaken investor confidence
and make the reconstruction of the financial sector more difficult and protracted, which, in turn, would
validate the perception that the suspension was not temporary but permanent.
Argentina’s bad credit history is what motivated policymakers there not to follow the British example
but to stand by the currency board, even at the risk of defeat in the recent presidential election. The hope
is that investors will recognize that a country willing to endure a severe recession and soaring unemployment
rates to preserve its commitment to avoid inflation has set aside policies of the past and achieved reform.
Argentina’s Currency Board During a Financial Crisis
Chart A
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are 4 million pesos: (1) 2 million
pesos of the original deposit plus
(2) the 2 million pesos of the ac-
counts opened to borrowers. The
cash reserves are 2 million pesos,
exactly enough to cover presumed
cash withdrawals for 50 percent of
the deposits. In other words, the 2
million pesos of cash reserves sup-
port twice as much in deposits. If,
however, all depositors simul-
taneously decided to cash in their
checking account balances, the
financial system would not be able
to satisfy the demand for 4 million
pesos in cash.
The difference between the
money created by the currency
board (actual bills and coins) and
the money created by the commer-
cial banks is important: the currency
board’s money is fully backed by
foreign reserves. In other words,
the currency board is able to buy
back all of its liabilities (bills and
coins) in exchange for foreign
currency at the established fixed
exchange rate.
In contrast, deposits in the private
financial system are not backed by
the currency board’s foreign re-
serves. The currency board is not
responsible for these deposits be-
cause they are private money,
money created by private financial
institutions and, therefore, the pri-
vate banks’ liabilities. In particular,
this means that the currency board
does not exchange checks for re-
serve currency. Anyone who wants
to carry out such a transaction will
first have to go to the bank, ex-
change the private money (check)
for the currency board money (bills
and coins) and then go to the cur-
rency board window to exchange
the cash for the reserve currency at
the fixed exchange rate.
In sum, the currency board’s
money is the base money, or in less
technical terms, the bills and coins
in the public’s pockets. Under a
currency board, the base money is
fully backed by foreign reserves
because the currency board prints
money only against the reserve
currency at a fixed exchange rate.
Moreover, the bills and coins issued
by the currency board are fully
convertible on demand at the fixed
exchange rate into the reserve cur-
rency, and vice versa.
Because a currency board views
the money issued by banks (depos-
its) as the banks’ private business,
currency boards do not regulate,
supervise or provide any lines of
credit to financial institutions. Finan-
cial institutions make their own
credit policies and their own deci-
sions about how much to maintain
in cash reserves. Under a currency
board, financial institutions are on
their own. There is no discount win-
dow they can go to if they have a
sudden and severe liquidity problem.
This is why countries with currency
boards are more prone to bank runs
and financial panics than countries
with full-fledged central banks.
Armor Against Devaluation
Why, then, are currency boards
seen as protection against devalua-
tion? The reason is because the
base money is fully backed by
foreign reserves. If reserves shrink
by $1 million, the money base has
to shrink by that amount times the
exchange rate. In the example
shown in Chart 2, this loss of re-
serves means the currency board
reduces bills and coins in circula-
tion by 2 million pesos ($1 million
times 2 pesos per $1). If foreign
reserves increase instead by $1 mil-
lion (from $2 million to $3 million),
the base money increases by 2
million pesos.
In other words, under a currency
board, the mechanism for expand-
ing and contracting the money
supply ensures that the proportion
of base money to reserves stays
constant at the fixed exchange rate.
As Chart 2 shows, a currency board
keeps the base money (bills and
coins) and the reserve currency
proportionate, the proportion im-
plicit in the fixed exchange rate.
For example, the ratio of the base
money to foreign reserves is always
2:1, which means that the currency
board can always buy back the
base money at the fixed exchange
rate of 2 pesos per dollar. There
will never be devaluations.
Central Banks and Devaluation
If a monetary authority does not
follow the strict rule of printing
money only against foreign reserves,
it is no longer a currency board. It’s
a central bank. When the monetary
authority prints money that is not
backed by reserves, the country
risks devaluation.
Central banks can issue money
through the discount window to
provide funds to financial institu-
tions with short-term liquidity prob-
lems. In effect, this action adds to
the base money (Chart 3) without
adding foreign reserves and breaks
the delicate balance between them.
This imbalance introduces the possi-
bility that the central bank will be
forced to devalue the currency. If
the public decides to exchange all
the base money in circulation for
foreign currency, the central bank
will not be able to defend the
current exchange rate.
In the case of Chart 3, the cen-
tral bank would need $3 million to
buy back the base money of 6 mil-
lion pesos at the exchange rate of
2:1. The central bank, however, has
only $2 million of foreign reserves,
so it must exchange at the rate of 3
pesos per $1. Thus, the local cur-
rency has devalued 50 percent.
Chart 2
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The armor against devaluation
provided by a currency board can
become a straitjacket in times of
financial panic. As explained earlier,
private banks typically keep only a
fraction of their deposits in cash.
With a currency board, banks do
not have the safety net of a dis-
count window when they need to
borrow short-term funds to face
transitory liquidity problems. Under
a currency board regime, the de-
posits and the banking system are
literally running on the confidence
of depositors. When that confi-
dence is broken, a bank panic can
ensue quickly. The mere suspicion
that a bank is insolvent can cause
depositors to fear for their savings
because a bank typically does not
have enough cash to cover all
outstanding deposits (See Chart 1).
This fear will trigger a run against
the bank, whose failure will create
fears of other bank failures, in a
chain reaction that can end up in
a full-blown financial panic.
Bank runs are less frequent and
severe with a central bank system.
With a central bank, an essentially
solvent bank with short-term liquid-
ity problems will not automatically
go under as it would in a currency
board system because it can appeal
to the discount window to cover
the temporary cash shortage.
Given the serious recessions that
usually follow the credit crunches
associated with bank panics, it is
easy to understand why countries
will be tempted to abandon cur-
rency boards and similar systems
during financial panics. In fact, that
is precisely what Great Britain did
on three occasions with its gold
standard, which works much like a
currency board, but with gold
playing the role foreign reserves
play under a currency board sys-
tem. In 1847, 1857 and 1866, Great
Britain suspended the gold stan-
dard to abort incipient financial
panics.
Scholarly research has shown
that, in Great Britain’s case, investors
expected convertibility to resume
eventually (Bordo and Kydland
1995). Argentina’s current financial
crisis raises the question of whether
Argentina could do as England did
and temporarily suspend its currency
board without hurting its credibility.
The answer is probably not, be-
cause Argentina’s monetary policy
track record is not what Great
Britain’s was at the time the gold
standard was suspended.
Conclusions
A currency board does not
magically restore the credibility of a
country’s economic policies, as
some advocates claim. The reason
is because currency boards can be
abandoned. When investors fear a
government is about to abandon its
currency board, they take their
capital out of the country, and
financial panic typically ensues, as
it recently did in Argentina. In such
circumstances, the armor against
devaluations that a currency board
supposedly provides becomes a
suffocating straitjacket societies and
their governments will be tempted
to cast off.
Behind these issues is a deeper
one. Are there political and eco-
nomic institutions that can guarantee
governments will never break their
promises? Economists and social
scientists are still trying to answer
this question. In the meantime, two
facts are evident.
First, if there are such institutions,
the currency board is not one of
them. Currency boards can be aban-
doned, and the fallacy behind their
alleged effectiveness is the assump-
tion they will never be.
Second, the track record of a
country seems far more important
for policy credibility than the par-
ticular label (central bank or cur-
rency board) of the institutions that
conduct policy. The monetary
policy of a central bank in a country
that has always shown fiscal and
monetary discipline and never de-
faulted on its debts will be far more
credible than the monetary policy
of a currency board in a country
that has a history of letting inflation
run unleashed, confiscating deposits
and defaulting on its debt.
A currency board might help an
inflation-addicted country avoid a
devaluation, but only if the country
maintains the currency board at all
costs. Countries adopting currency
boards must be ready to endure the
severe financial crisis and high
unemployment that come with the
credit crunch that is sure to follow
a financial panic. Such panics are
likely because a currency board is
not a magic pill that restores cred-
ibility instantly and painlessly.
When recommending currency
boards, their advocates should
warn policymakers that currency
boards will not spare them the time
and economic hardships necessary
to restore the credibility lost at the
hands of bad policies of the past.
—Carlos E. Zarazaga
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racy. A commonly used statistical
measure of corruption places the
country at the same level as the
United Kingdom and Denmark.
Chile has already solved policy
problems that have kept other Latin
American nations at the chalk-
board. As a result, Chile, unlike
other countries in the region, has had
11 years of uninterrupted growth.
The purpose of liberalizing trade
with any country is efficiency.
Trade protectionism at any level
really means that government is
bestowing uncompetitively high
profits on some industries, the pro-
tected ones, at the expense of the
buying public. But trade protec-
tionism also means that, because of
these uncompetitively high profits,
capital and labor are misdirected to
firms and industries that are profit-
able because they don’t compete
and directed away from firms and
industries that can compete without
such interference. With freer trade,
capital and labor will go where
they are most productive, instead of
to a profitable but less productive
use. With free trade, market signals
will bring greater efficiency, which
is simply more total output from
the same capital and labor.
With fewer than 14 million
people, Chile is a small country,
considerably less populous than the
state of Texas. It nonetheless holds
opportunities for greater efficiency,
and the message Chile’s member-
ship in NAFTA would send is a
cheap form of advertising for more
open trade with much larger Latin
American countries.
N
egotiations began in June to add
Chile to the North American
Free Trade Agreement. But in the
United States, naysayers from both
sides of the political spectrum have
begun to quibble about voting for
fast-track authority, which would
allow the administration to negoti-
ate a trade agreement subject to
congressional vote but without
congressional amendment.
U.S. officials have from time to
time complained that the glacial
procedures of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade kept us
from agreeing to mutually benefi-
cial trade openings as large as U.S.
policymakers would prefer with all
countries. The United States has
for years been urging developing
countries toward free trade and has
invoked sanctions when they didn’t
move fast enough. The central
theme of the Summit of the Americas
last year in Miami was Western
Hemispheric economic integration.
Now is the time for the United
States to send a message that it
isn’t kidding about free trade, even
when a potential partner is a devel-
oping nation that can’t use our
country as a safety valve for its un-
employment problems. Fast-track
authority for negotiations with Chile
would send a message to the rest
of Latin America about the commit-
ment the United States professes.
A free trade agreement with Chile
ought to be a no-brainer. In the last
decade, Chile has privatized the
great majority of its public corpora-
tions, liberalized investment markets,
slashed tariffs and moved from a
military government to a democ-11
Regional Update
FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
more information on TIPI, see “The Texas Indus-
trial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic
Review, November 1989). For more information
on the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
On-line economic data and articles are avail-
able on the Dallas Fed’s electronic bulletin board,
FEDFLASH (214-922-5199 or 800-333-1953).
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- Service- New
Index Total Mining tion turing ment Producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
5/95 112.4 118.5 156.4 399.5 1,030.3 1,435.1 4,930.1 7,951.4 1,787.0 686.0
4/95 111.5 118.5 156.8 400.5 1,032.9 1,434.2 4,930.7 7,955.1 1,783.2 685.8
3/95 110.0 118.6 157.3 403.1 1,031.4 1,430.5 4,900.5 7,922.8 1,784.4 685.3
2/95 111.1 119.1 157.0 404.8 1,028.8 1,430.8 4,880.7 7,902.1 1,782.4 684.3
1/95 110.5 118.9 157.0 405.4 1,024.5 1,429.2 4,851.4 7,867.5 1,781.8 681.5
12/94 111.4 118.3 157.8 398.5 1,022.7 1,426.1 4,870.8 7,875.9 1,774.5 675.3
11/94 111.9 118.2 159.7 393.3 1,021.1 1,420.7 4,851.5 7,846.3 1,764.0 674.2
10/94 112.0 118.5 160.7 389.9 1,020.2 1,418.3 4,838.9 7,828.0 1,755.1 669.0
9/94 111.9 118.4 163.1 387.9 1,017.7 1,417.9 4,834.4 7,821.0 1,743.8 664.5
8/94 112.1 118.4 162.9 383.1 1,014.3 1,423.5 4,817.7 7,801.5 1,729.3 658.3
7/94 111.4 118.3 162.5 380.3 1,010.6 1,414.4 4,797.2 7,765.0 1,719.4 660.2
6/94 111.2 118.3 162.8 376.9 1,007.4 1,417.0 4,759.5 7,723.6 1,710.3 655.4
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100









































Net Contributions of Components to Change In Leading Index,￿
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The economy of the Eleventh District
is continuing a gradual slowdown that
began earlier in the year. After growing
at an annualized rate of 2.6 percent in
the first quarter of 1995, employment
in Louisiana, New Mexico and Texas
slowed further in April and May, to an
annual growth rate of 1.9 percent for
the two-month period.
The slowdown in employment
growth became evident in the service
sector during the first quarter and has
now spread to manufacturing. In May,
manufacturing employment fell 3 percent
in Texas and 7.4 percent in New Mexico.
Manufacturing employment in Louisiana
accelerated in May to 4.5 percent. Much
of the slower growth in manufacturing
has been centered in sectors supplying
single-family construction, such as lum-
ber, furniture, brick, glass and primary
metals. Employment has declined as
well in other industries, such as paper,
apparel, and food products. Employ-
ment in fabricated metals and computer-
related industries continues to grow
strongly. Texas industrial production in
manufacturing fell 1.3 percent in March
and 4.9 percent in April, the first two
months of consecutive decline since
June of 1991.
Despite the recent slowing in employ-
ment, the District economy still shows
signs of strength. Falling mortgage rates
have sparked a rebound in District resi-
dential construction. After declining in
April, single-family permits rose in May
to their highest level since January 1994.
The recent decline in the Texas value
of the dollar is another sign of regional
economic strength. After surging from
November to March, the real peso–dollar
exchange rate dropped sharply in April
and May. While the real peso–dollar
exchange rate was 36 percent higher in
May than in November 1994, the deprecia-
tion of the dollar relative to Texas’ other
export markets has resulted in only a
7.7-percent appreciation in the Texas-
export weighted value of the dollar.
The Texas index of leading economic
indicators rebounded in April and May,
following a decline in the index since
last November. Recent movements in the
index suggest that the District economy’s
gradual slowing will continue in the
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WHO SHOULD ATTEND
The conference is designed to meet the needs of central bankers, chief economists, government policymakers, international economists
and senior-level management in trade offices, commercial banks, mutual funds, investment banks, international finance firms and
multinational corporations.
Place: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2200 N. Pearl Street, Dallas, Texas 75201
Fee: $150 (U.S.) per person
For more information, call Agnes Mitchell at (800) 333-4460, ext. 5260
SPEAKERS INCLUDE
• Andrés Bianchi, Banco Crédit Lyonnais • Alan S. Blinder, Federal Reserve Board of Governors • Vittorio Corbo, Catholic Uni-
versity of Chile • John W. Crow, Lévesque Beaubien Geoffrion Inc. • Michael P. Dooley, University of California, Santa Cruz
• Sebastian Edwards, World Bank • Jeffrey A. Frankel, University of California, Berkeley • Peter M. Garber, Brown University
• Ricardo Hausmann, Inter-American Development Bank • Alan Meltzer, Carnegie Mellon University
The dramatic growth of international capital flows has provided unprecedented opportunities and risks in emerging markets. Investors,
policymakers, central bankers and other practitioners who interact in these markets on a daily basis need to keep abreast of the most
up-to-date information. This conference will provide the insight and observations of some of the most highly respected policymakers
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A Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference
September 14–15, 1995